This paper studies environmental taxation in a Mirrlees setting with two novel features. First, energy, a polluting good, is used both as a factor of production and a final consumption good; second, the wage is determined endogenously while labor of different individual types remain homogeneous. The model is calibrated for the French economy. We show that: (i) The optimal tax is less than the marginal social damage of emissions and turns into an outright subsidy when the inequality aversion index is high; (ii) the optimal tax on energy as an input is always equal to its marginal social damage; (iii) the social welfare gain due to lowering the current energy taxes to their optimal levels, with the general income tax being set optimally in both cases, is between 17 to 32 euro per household.
Introduction
The existing empirical studies of environmental taxes are almost exclusively in the (homogeneous households) Ramsey tradition. They typically allow only for linear tax instruments and adhere to a "representative consumer" framework. fixed. This is, with the notable exception of Naito (1999), the common assumption of the literature on optimal general income taxation. However, when there are other factors of production besides labor in the economy, the workers' pretax earning abilities (wages) change. We consider this problem at a theoretical level, we also compute an optimal general income tax schedule numerically while allowing for this endogeneity.
We model an open economy with three factors of production and two categories of consumption goods. The factors of production are labor, capital, and energy. Labor is homogeneous in efficiency units with different individual types having different endowments of labor in efficiency units . The assumption of homogeneity of labor in efficiency units rules out the possibility that energy used as an intermediate good can be a substitute to some type of labor and a complement to another. As will be demonstrated later, this assumption ensures that the Diamond and Mirrlees production efficiency result continues to hold despite the endogeneity of wage. 2 All workers are immobile and no labor is either exported or imported. Capital inputs are rented from outside so that all capital incomes go to "foreigners"; energy inputs are also imported. 3 Emissions come from two sources: the use of energy input on the production side, and the consumption of one category of final goods on the consumption side (designated as polluting goods). The specific emissions we are concerned with are carbon dioxide emissions. The production process consists of two stages. First, a constant returns to scale production technology uses the three inputs to produce a "general-purpose"
output. Second, a linear technology transforms the output into the two categories of consumption goods at constant marginal (equal to average) costs. The first-stage production function is "nested CES". Consumers' preferences are also nested CES, being a function of labor and the two final goods.
The model is calibrated for the French economy on the basis of the data from the "Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques" (INSEE),
France. We identify four groups of individuals who differ not only in earning abilities but also in tastes. They are identified as "managerial staff", "intermediatesalaried employees", "white-collar workers" and "blue-collar workers". The polluting and non-polluting goods are constructed from 117 consumption goods according to whether they are energy related or not. 4 We use two values for the marginal social damage of emissions. A French Government Commission (Groupe Interministériel sur l'effet de Serre) recommended a figure of 229 euro as the cost per ton of carbon. This is the basis for the benchmark figure we use. For the purpose of comparisons, we also use a second value for the social damage of emissions based on a cost of 92 euro per ton of carbon. 5 We model the behavior of the government as one of setting optimal tax policies in light of the constraints that it faces. We use an iso-elastic social welfare function for this purpose. Moreover, the value of the inequality aversion index is chosen according to the observed degree of redistribution in the existing French tax system. Specifically, based on a recent study by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2000),
we shall use 0.1 and 1.9 to be the limiting values for the inequality aversion index.
The private sector
Consider an open economy which uses three factors of production to produce two categories of consumption goods. The factors of production are labor, capital and energy. Labor is heterogeneous with different groups of individuals having different productivity levels. All types of workers are immobile so that labor is neither exported nor imported. All capital and energy inputs are rented from outside. There are two sources of emissions in the economy. On the production side, the use of labor and capital entail no emissions but the use of energy inputs does. On the consumption side, consuming one category of goods is non-polluting, but consuming the other category (energy) generates emissions.
Specifically, we assume that there are four groups of individuals with differing productivity levels and tastes. All persons, regardless of their type, are endowed with one unit of time. Denote a person's type by j (j = 1, 2, 3, 4), his productivity factor by n j , and the proportion of people of type j in the economy by π j .
Normalize the population size at one, and define the Preferences of j-type person over his labor supply, L j , consumption of a "non-polluting" good, x j , a "polluting good", y j , and total level of emissions in the atmosphere, E.
Production
The production process consists of two stages. First, a constant returns to scale production technology uses three inputs to produce a "general-purpose" output,
O. Second, a linear technology transforms the output into the two categories of consumption goods, x and y, at constant marginal (equal to average) costs. The inputs to the first stage of production are: labor, L, capital, K, and energy, D.
The production function F (L, K, D) is assumed to be "nested CES". It is written
with
where B and A are constants, and σ and δ are the (Allen) elasticities of substitution between L and Γ, and between K and D. Substituting for Γ from (2) into (1), we have
Aggregate output, O, is the numeraire and the units of x and y are chosen such that their producer prices are equal to one.
Capital services and energy inputs are imported at constant world prices of r and p D where the units of D is chosen such that p D = 1. Let w denotes the price of one unit of effective labor, τ D denotes the tax on energy input, and assume that there are no producer taxes on labor and capital. 6 The first-order conditions for the firms' input-hiring decisions are, assuming competitive markets,
Equations ( 
Consumption
The consumer side is modeled à la Cremer et al. (2003) . Consumers' preferences are nested CES, first in goods and labor supply and then in the two categories of consumer goods. All consumer types have identical elasticities of substitution between leisure and non-leisure goods, ρ, and between polluting and non-polluting goods, ω. Differences in tastes are captured by differences in other parameter values of the posited utility function (a j and b j in equations (8)- (9) below). Assume further that emissions enter the utility function linearly. The preferences for a person of type j can then be represented by
where θ j reflects the "taste parameter" and
With emissions emanating from production as well as consumption, total level of emissions is given by
Consumers choose their consumption bundles by maximizing (7)-(9) subject to their budget constraints. These will be nonlinear functions when the income tax schedule is nonlinear. However, for the purpose of uniformity in exposition, we characterize the consumers' choices, as the solution to an optimization problem in which each person faces a (type-specific) linearized and possibly truncated budget constraint. To do this, introduce a "virtual income," G j , into each type's budget constraint. Denote the j-type's net of tax wage by w j n . We can then write j's budget constraint as
where p and q are the consumer prices of x and y, G j is the income adjustment term (virtual income) needed for linearizing the budget constraint (or the lumpsum rebate if the tax function is linear), and M j is the individual's exogenous income. The first-order conditions for a j-type's optimization problem are
Equations (11)-(13) determine x j , y j and L j as functions of p, q, w
Observe that our demand specification combines homothetic preferences with heterogeneous tastes. As it will become clear below, heterogeneous tastes play an important role in our analysis. As far as the analytical modeling is concerned, allowing for heterogeneity provides an additional measure of generality. However, when it comes to the calibration, our setting is restrictive. Because preferences are homothetic, we are effectively assuming that all differences in the mix of final goods are due to taste differences. Thus differences in consumption patterns, particularly the observed fact that low income people consume a higher proportion of their income on energy goods, are treated as if they have been caused by taste differentials. Although these differences may very well be due to differences in incomes. This has to be kept in mind in interpreting our results.
Finally, observe that w (the price of one unit of effective labor) from the production side, and w j n (the net of tax wage of a j-type person) from the consumption side, are related. Denote the productivity of a j-type worker by n j . Then, j-type's gross of tax wage will be w j = wn j . Denoting the j-type's marginal income tax rate by t j , his net of tax wage is w j n = w j (1 − t j ). Determining w thus determines the general equilibrium solution for the economy as whole [equations (4)- (13)].
This is done by equating aggregate demand for, and aggregate supply of effective labor. Now, when j works for L j hours, his effective labor is n j L j resulting in aggregate supply of
This then should be equated with aggregate demand, L, as given by equation (4):
Data and the calibration
To determine the general equilibrium solution of the economy numerically, one must know different workers' productivity rates and their respective shares in total labor force (n j , π j ), the parameters of the production function (σ, δ, α, β, A, B), On the production side, σ and δ are calculated on the basis of current estimates in the literature. 8 We set r = 0.08. This is the commonly rate used in France for public investment decisions. 9 Given r, σ, δ, and the data for L, K, D and w, we calibrate α, β, A and B.
We identify four types of households: "managerial staff" (Type 1), "intermediate- . 10 We calculate a j 's and b j 's such that the observed data for households' expenditures and labor incomes are reconciled. This procedure is also used to calculate M j 's;
we do not have direct estimates for them.
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Finally, given the disagreement in the literature over the size of the marginal social damage of carbon emissions, we use a value for φ based on a 1990 recommendation of the "Groupe Interministériel sur l'effet de Serre". This was a
French Government Commission set up to undertake an economics study of the greenhouse effect. The recommendation called for a carbon tax of 229 euro (1,500
French Francs) per ton of carbon. This translates into approximately a 10% tax on the cost of producing one "unit" of polluting good. 12 Assuming that 229 euro measures the social damage of a ton of carbon, and because the optimal tax on the polluting good at the first best is its marginal social damage, we calibrate the value of φ in such a way as it would give rise to a first-best tax of 10%. 13 We then fix the value of φ at this estimated value for all the second-best tax calculations.
The 229 euro figure translates into 62 euro per ton of CO 2 emissions. Thus, if one considers CO 2 emissions only, this figure appears on the high side given the published values for the social damage of a ton of CO 2 emissions. These vary between 1.50 to 51 dollars. 14 Another argument in favor of using a lower figure for the social damage is that the domestic damage is lower than the global damage.
It is not at all clear though that a country's government should consider only the domestic social damage in its welfare calculations. If all countries set their taxes optimally and act cooperatively, the global social damage appears to be the appropriate measure to use. 15 Given these considerations, and for the purpose of comparisons, we also consider a lower value for the social damage corresponding to a cost of 92 euro per ton of carbon. This, being 40% of the 229 euro figure, necessitates the calculation and use of a second value for φ such that the first-best tax will be 4% instead of 10%.
The French benchmark tax system
In order to compare the current French tax system with the alternative tax policies we study, the current system must be simplified so that it satisfies the assumptions of our model. We thus construct a simplified version of the French economy which we call "the French benchmark tax system". This differs from the "real" French tax system in three key respects. First, the population is comprised of only four types of households; second all households work; and third all capital is imported so that labor is the only source of domestic income. 16 Specifically, we solve the model of Section 2 using the observed values for the tax rates in France previously mentioned and the calibrated parameter values of subsection 2.3. This differs from the specifications of the French economy in that it sets all calculated exogenous incomes (M j 's) equal to zero. Table 2 reports the solution values whenever they differ from the actual system. Note that the macro (type-independent) variables are extremely close to the actual observed values given in Table 1 . The solutions for the household types differ in two important respects. First, the figures for the four types' labor supplies are somewhat higher than their actual observed values. This is easy to explain. Given that the aggregate labor supply in the benchmark system is close to its actual observed value, the benchmark attributes the excluded groups' labor supplies to the included four. The second difference appears in consumption levels. The assumption of no domestic capital income results in expenditure levels for the benchmark system that are lower than the observed ones.
The government
The government is interested in designing an optimal tax system consisting of a general income tax, and taxes on energy as a consumption good and as an intermediate good. The design of an optimal tax structures must be based on some underlying social welfare function. For this purpose, we will use an isoelastic social welfare function of the form
where η is the "inequality aversion index". The higher is η the more the society values equality. 17 In choosing a value for η (the inequality aversion index) for our optimal tax calculations, we will be guided by the observed degree of redistribution in the existing French tax system. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2000) have recently studied
France's social preferences as revealed through its tax system. They find that, if the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.1, the marginal social welfare falls from 110 to 90 percent of the mean as income increases from the lowest to the highest level. The fall would be from 150 percent to 50 percent if the uncompensated labor elasticity is 0.5.
With the social welfare function (15), the marginal social utility of income for a j-type person is given by
This implies that the ratio of the marginal social utility of the Managerial Staff's (type 1)income to Blue Collars's (Type 4) income is
Calculating the values for ∂f j /∂M j and f j (j = 1, 4) based on the French data summarized in Table 1 , setting the above expression equal to 9/11, we derive a value for η equal to 0.1. This is the implied value for the inequality aversion index in France (if the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.1). Similarly, setting the above expression equal to 5/15, we derive a value for η equal to 1.9 for the implied value of the inequality aversion index in France (if the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.5).
Measuring welfare changes
A change in the government's tax policy, environmental or otherwise, changes the welfare different households differently. We shall measure these using the Hicksian "equivalent variation" concept of a welfare change, EV . 18 Similarly, we can associate a measure of "aggregate welfare change" to any tax policy by calculating how much one has to uniformly compensate each individual under the benchmark system, to bring social welfare under the benchmark to parity with that under the considered tax policy. 19 4 The optimal general income tax with linear energy taxes
The standard assumption in the optimal income tax literature à la Mirrlees is that incomes are publicly observable so that the tax administration can levy an optimal general income tax. We adopt this, and the accompanying assumption on the unobservability of wages and labor supplies, in order to rule out differential lump-sum taxation. Regarding consumption taxes, we shall assume that the available information is on anonymous transactions (and not on personal consumption levels which would be difficult to justify). This rules out nonlinear consumption taxes. In determining the mix of optimal general income and linear consumption taxes, we follow Cremer and Gahvari (1997)'s method and begin with the characterization of Pareto-efficient allocations that are constrained not only by the standard self-selection constraints and the resource balance, but also by the linearity of commodity taxes. However, the current problem is fundamentally more complex than Cremer and Gahvari (1997)'s (as well as the traditional optimal income tax problems à la Mirrlees). The endogeneity of w adds another dimension to the problem which is generally missing in the formulation of optimal income tax problems. 20 This requires us to extend Cremer and Gahvari's method, as explained below.
We start by deriving an optimal revelation mechanism that consists of a set of type-specific before-tax incomes, I j 's, aggregate expenditures on private goods, c j 's, and a fixed tax rate (same for everyone) on the polluting good, q −1. Observe that, with one extra degree in setting the commodity tax rates, due to demand and labor supply functions being homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income, we have set the tax rate on the non-polluting goods equal to zero so that p = 1. This procedure determines the polluting tax rate right from the outset. A complete solution to the optimal tax problem per-se then requires only the design of a general income tax function.
The mechanism assigns (I j , c j , q) to an individual who reports type j; the consumer then allocates c j between the produced goods, x and y. 21 Denote
One can then determine, by setting M j = 0 in equations (11) and (12), the "conditional" demand functions for x j and y j as x j = x(p, q, c j ; θ j ) and
These functions are independent of individual j's labor supply because of the weak separability of his preferences. 22 Substituting these equations in the j-type's utility function, we have
Analytical results
The problem is solved analytically in Section A1 of the Appendix. 23 A number of analytical results are obtained. First, the optimal tax on energy as a consumption goods is non-Pigouvian (Proposition A1). This generalizes our earlier result in Cremer et al. (1998) derived for exogenously given wage rates. As in that paper, the "Pigouvian tax" is defined as the marginal social damage of pollution when each type's private damage in utility terms is transformed into "social" dollars using the government's shadow cost of public funds, μ. It is measured, given our specification of the social welfare function and preferences, by h P 
Numerical results
The numerical solutions are derived using GAUSS's constrained optimization program. 
Basic scenarios
The first row of Table 3 reports four values for the optimal tax on the polluting good based on two values for the marginal social damage of emissions and two values for the inequality aversion index. The second row reports the values for the Pigouvian tax which, on the basis of the results presented in the previous subsection, is equal to the optimal tax on the polluting input.
The interesting feature of our result is that while the optimal tax on the polluting input is always equal to the Pigouvian tax, the optimal tax on the polluting good is always less than the Pigouvian tax. Indeed, in three out of four cases, the polluting good must be subsidized rather than taxed. The reason for this is in the roles that input and output taxes play. The tax on the polluting input serves one purpose only: It is imposed to correct the social damage of emissions.
The tax on the polluting good, on the other hand, serves two purposes: One is, as with the polluting inputs, externality correcting; the second is redistributive.
Whereas the externality correction calls for the taxation of the polluting good, the redistributive objective calls for its subsidization (relative to non-polluting goods). This is because the poor spend proportionally more of their incomes on the polluting goods. The optimal tax on polluting goods balances these two objectives.
In interpreting our numerical results, however, a particular shortcoming of our calibrations must be borne in mind. Our demand specification combines homothetic preferences with heterogeneous tastes. This implies that we are effectively attributing all differences in the mix of final goods, in particular the observed fact that low income people consume a higher proportion of their income on energy goods, to taste differentials. Although these differences may very well be due to differences in incomes.
Note also that the higher is the inequality aversion index, the higher will be the deviation of the optimal tax relative to the Pigouvian tax. The intuition is found in the two roles that output taxes embody. The Pigouvian element of output taxes is invariant to redistributive ends. This is obviously not the case for their redistributive element. The more we care about the poor, the higher we want to subsidize their consumption of polluting goods (relative to non-polluting goods).
Thus, with a low value for φ, when η increases from 0.1 to 1.9, the optimal subsidy on energy consumption increases from 1.71% to 12.40%; but the Pigouvian tax remains very much unchanged at 4%. Similarly, with a high value for φ, when η increases from 0.1 to 1.9, the optimal tax on the consumption decreases from 3.90%
to an outright subsidy of 7.32%; with the Pigouvian tax remaining unchanged at 10%.
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The first row in Table 4 reports the changes in aggregate emissions. It indicates that the optimal policy entails an increase in aggregate emissions. This occurs for two reasons. First, the optimal policy entails a cut in taxes on energy-related consumption goods thus boosting their demand. Secondly, the increased efficiency of the tax system as a whole encourages production and with it energy use and consumption. Note that the introduction of taxes on energy inputs, on the other hand, has a dampening effect on the use of energy and thus works to mitigate the increase in emissions.
On the redistributive front, the tax system becomes much more progressive.
The implied EV figures, and the associated social welfare changes, are reported in and η = 0.1. Moreover, as one might expect, the gains to the poor and the losses of the rich increase with η. The increase in social welfare is also more pronounced for the higher value of η.
Optimal system with the current energy tax
These changes come about as a result of the change in the whole structure of the tax system, and particularly the change in the income tax structure. To isolate the effects of environmental taxes per se, we also find the tax equilibrium of the economy while only setting the income tax optimally keeping the energy taxes fixed at their current values. Then we compare the resulting equilibrium with the previously calculated optimal system. Any difference must be due solely to the change in environmental taxes. With some adjustments, the procedure for determining the new equilibrium is the same as that of solving the initial unconstrained tax problem. A formal solution is presented in Section A2 of the Appendix. It requires one to impose two additional constraints on the original problem. They are:
reflecting the current 40.32% average energy consumption tax relative to other goods and zero energy input taxes. The first constraint implies that we no longer optimize with respect to q; the second constraint enters as an additional term in the Lagrangian expression. The interesting implication of this latter constraint is that it implies O K (L, K, D) should no longer be set equal to r. Put differently, it calls for a producer tax on r. On the other hand,
is not affected and continues to be optimal.
With the exception of the values for polluting input and aggregate emissions, the equilibrium of this economy looks very much the same as when the environmental taxes were unrestricted. This suggests that the drastic changes to the benchmark system are essentially due to a switch to an optimal general income tax system. Table 5 reports the redistributive effects of environmental taxes per se by comparing the equilibria of the general income tax structure with and without emission taxes. It also reports the resulting changes in aggregate emissions.
Observe that cutting the energy consumption taxes from their current values (as the optimum requires), and the introduction of energy input taxes, hurts the rich (Type 1) and benefits the poor (Type 4) substantially. Types 2 and 3 also benefit, although not by as much. Observe also that, for the same marginal social damage of emissions φ, a higher value for the inequality aversion index η translates into more losses for Type 1 and more gains for type 4. The implied gains to social welfare, while not very huge, are nevertheless more than modest.
Varying relative wages
Our specification allows for endogenous wages but in such a way as to keep relative wages of different labor types constant. Specifically, we have w j = wn j , where the n j 's are given parameters while w (the overall wages level) is endogenously determined according to (4) . This is done to keep the numerical simulations tractable. Recall that in our setting, Type 1 agents are the high-productivity workers.
At the other end of the spectrum, Types 3 and 4 have almost identical wages (n 3 and n 4 are close). We thus consider two alternative scenarios. The first increases n 3 and n 4 by 5%, leaves n 2 unchanged, and adjusts n 1 such that the average level of n does not change. The constancy of average n is imposed so that we are able to separate the effect of a change in relative productivities from a change in the overall productivity level. The second scenario is the mirror image of the first in which we reduce n 3 and n 4 by 5%, again leave n 2 unchanged, and adjust n 1 to keep the average level of n intact. Table 6 of low-productivity individuals increase, and the wage gap narrows, the tax on the polluting good increases. Thus the implicit subsidy relative to a Pigouvian output tax is reduced. And when relative wages of low-productivity individuals decrease, and the wage gap widens, the tax on the polluting good decreases. That is, the implicit subsidy relative to a Pigouvian output tax increases. Observe also that, as with the reference case, the higher is the inequality aversion index, the higher is the deviation of the optimal tax relative to the Pigouvian tax. For the rest, the changes that occur are not dramatic.
Summary and conclusion
This paper has explored the design of an optimal general income tax system when the wage rate is endogenous, labor is homogeneous, and energy is used both as a polluting consumption good and a polluting input. The paper has shown that the optimal tax on energy inputs is Pigouvian and equal to its marginal social damage. The optimal tax on the consumption of energy, on the other hand, is less than its marginal social damage. In fact, in three out of four cases, energy consumption should be subsidized. This is in marked contrast to the current tax system in France which taxes energy consumption over 40% relative to non-energy related goods. The reason for this is the fact that the poor spend proportionally more of their income on energy consumption than the rich.
To gauge the welfare implications of environmental taxes per se, we have compared the optimal general income tax equilibria at the current environmental taxes and at their optimal values. The results indicated substantial losses for the rich (Type 1) and substantial gains for the poor (type 4). In comparison, the effects on Types 2 and 3 were rather marginal. The redistributive aspects of such taxes, which are quite important, are naturally masked in a one-consumer representation of the economy. This tells us that in calculating optimal income and consumption taxes, including environmental taxes, one should go beyond the traditional Ramsey tax framework.
The methods of this paper can be used to compute optimal tax structures for other countries. Better data may allow for a greater number of types. It should also allow for a more disaggregated set of goods and better parameter estimates. Another extension would be to consider non-homothetic preferences directly. Most importantly, an extension that considers non-homogeneous labor, and thus allows for energy input to be a substitute for low-skilled labor (lowability types) and a complement to high-skilled labor (high-ability types) will throw light on the extent that the energy input tax should deviate from the Pigouvian tax for redistribution. The current paper should be viewed more as a first step contribution to this endeavor, rather than the exactness of its reported numbers. Nevertheless the numbers are interesting even if only indicative.
Notes
1 See, e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) and the references contained therein. 2 The implications of this assumption is discussed in subsection 4.1 below. 3 There are two reasons for assuming capital is rented from outside. One, we do not have data on holdings of capital by different types of workers. Second, taxation of capital in a static setting is not an interesting question. The similar assumption on energy inputs is for simplicity in exposition and of no relevant consequence.
2005b) and references therein. In our framework, although wages are endogenous, types are given. Our aim is to present a relatively simple framework for the numerical calculations of environmental taxes simultaneously with an optimal general income tax, in a setting with two dimensions of heterogeneity particularly when the wage is endogenous. It is these features that distinguishes our study from the other papers in the literature.
(0.85), and Bourguignon (1999) reports a range of 0.1 to 0.5 for the existing estimates of wage elasticity of labor supply which translate into a range of estimates for ρ from to 0.61 to 1.39. We thus also set ω = 0.99, ρ = 0.61 and ρ = 1.39 in our optimal tax calculations for sensitivity analysis.
11 Details of the data and calibration can be obtained from the authors directly. 12 We assume that energy consists of coal, natural gas, electricity, gasoline, and oil. We have data on the consumption levels of each of these components in their physical units and the carbon content of each physical unit. This gives us the total carbon content of energy consumption. We also know the euro cost of producing each component and thus the production costs of the total energy used. (The component shares are 0.94% coal, 8.79% natural gas, 28.01% electricity, and 62.26% gasoline and oil). Dividing the number for total carbon content of energy consumption by the number for the production cost gives us the carbon content of producing one euro of energy. Assuming the component shares do not change, we can compute the cost of producing that amount of energy with a one ton carbon content. This comes to about 2,290 euro. Consequently, a 229 euro tax on one ton of carbon translates into a 10% tax. 13 Specifying the social welfare function as
, the marginal social damage of emissions is defined as h P j π j W 0j ) i φ/μ, where μ is the shadow cost of public funds (the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government's budget constraint). This is the formula for the first-best Pigouvian tax.
Observe also that we will have a different value for φ for each set of parameters
14 See, "Marginal damage estimates for air pollutants", U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/oppt/epp/guidance/top20faqexterchart.htm. 15 There is also the costs associated with nitrogen oxides due to use of some types of energy. Presumably, though, one should leave this out if one is concerned with a carbon tax only. 16 As observed earlier, these simplifications are necessitated by the limitation of the existing data and the fact that we are interested only in labor income taxes.
Optimal taxation of capital in a static model is not an interesting question. 17 As is well-known, η = 0 implies a utilitarian social welfare function and η → ∞ a Rawlsian. When η = 1, the social welfare function is given by
18 Let V(·; θ j ) denote a j-type's "indirect utility" function as defined by equation (16). The equivalent variation in the j-type's going from the benchmark B to the alternative tax system i, EV j i , is defined from
We will then measure the "welfare change" in going from policy i to k for individual
19 The aggregate welfare measure associated with going from the benchmark B to the alternative tax system i, EV S i , is formally defined by
20 Naito (1999) is an exception. 21 Strictly speaking, this procedure does not characterize "allocations" as such;
the optimization is over a mix of quantities and prices. However, given the commodity prices, utility maximizing individuals would choose the quantities themselves. We can thus think of the procedure as indirectly determining the final allocations. 22 The functions, and the corresponding indirect utility function V (·; θ j ), are conditional on c j ; they differ from the customary Marshallian demand and indirect utility functions. 23 The appendix is available through JEEM's online archive of supplementary material, which can be accessed through a link at http://www.aere.org/journals/. 24 This is Cremer et al. (1998) definition of the Pigouvian tax. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and others use the Samuelson's rule for optimal provision of public goods to define the "Pigouvian tax".
They term a tax Pigouvian if it is equal to the sum of the private dollar costs of the environmental damage per unit of the polluting good across all households. In our notation, their Pigouvian tax is P j π j φ/α j , where α j is the j-type's private marginal utility of income. 25 Intuitively, the reason that one may do better with an input tax in Naito is that pushing the wage of the unskilled workers up weakens an already binding incentive compatibility constraint. 26 We are grateful to a careful referee who brought this point to our attention. 27 This program, with a number of different iterative algorithms, is particularly suitable for optimization of nonlinear functions subject to nonlinear inequality constraints. One such routine, which we have used, is the Boyden-FletcherGoldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) method known for its excellent convergence properties even for ill-behaved problems. 28 The alternative definition of the Pigouvian tax yields the following values for φ P j π j /α j : 3.88% (φ = 0.016, η = 0.1), 3.68% (φ = 0.016, η = 1.9), 9.68%
(φ = 0.40, η = 0.1), and 9.19% (φ = 0.040, η = 1.9). Note that these values also exceed the values for the optimal polluting good taxes. However, they are smaller than the optimal input taxes. [12] Les couts de reference de la production delectricite. DGEMP-DIGEC, Ministere de lEconomie et des Finances.
[ Table 4 . Emission and welfare changes in going to an optimal environmental-cum-general-income-tax system (monetary figures in euro) Table 6 . Optimal polluting good taxes when relative, but not average, productivities change (n 2 is unchanged and n 1 is adjusted) φ = 0.016 φ = 0.040 η = 0.1 η = 1.9 η = 0.1 η = 1.9 Reference productivities -1.79% -12.40% 3.90% -7.32% n 3 and n 4 ↑ by 5% -0.61% -11.17% 5.17% -6.00% n 3 and n 4 ↓ by 5% -2.96% -13.50% 2.65% -8.51%
where    and  are the multipliers associated respectively with the resource constraints, the incentive constraint and the endogenous wage condition. The first-order conditions are, for  = 1 2 3 4,
resulting equation to (A2). Simplifying, using Roy's identity, results in
To simplify equation (A8 We get
Next, rewrite the last term on the left-hand side of equation (A8) as
where in going from the second to the last expression, we have made use of Roy's identity. Now substituting from (A11)-(A12) into (A8) and simplifying results in
Denote the compensated demand function for  by e y ¡    ;  
This proves that  −1 is non-Pigouvian unless the polluting good demand depends only on one's income but not on his taste so that the second expression on the right-hand side of (A13) will be zero.
Second, we prove that the input tax is Pigouvian regardless of individuals'
tastes. The proof is facilitated through the following lemma.
Lemma A1 In the optimal income tax problem (A1), and characterized by the 
Thus, the constraint O  (  ) = 1 implies that O  (  ) should no longer be set equal to . Put differently, a producer tax on  is now optimal.
